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By WILLIAM H. LEWIS
William H. Lewis has been associated with North African affairs since 1952. He
conducted his doctoral research in the area under Ford Foundation sponsorship and has
since held appointments in the Department of State and in the academic community-
University of Michigan, Georgetown University, and Johns Hopkins. Dr. Lewis has
coauthored a number of books on Middle Eastern and African affairs and is a frequent
contributor to professional journals.
ABSTRACT: The North African littoral assumed special im-
portance for the United States after the landing of American
forces in November 1942. While the strategic-military weight
assigned to the area by the West declined after 1956, with the
growth of local nationalist movements and the relinquish-
ment of French protectorate authority over Morocco and
Tunisia, North Africa has acquired a unique political and
economic significance and relevance for Western interests.
The United States, for its part, has sought to support the
nation-building efforts of local governments without undue
regard to their political philosophies or foreign policy orienta-
tions. Measured in pragmatic as well as historic terms, the
American contribution has been both constructive and enduring.
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HE prevalent atmosphere of pes-
simism that characterizes our for-
eign studies community is not new to
academia. We have witnessed similar
moods shortly after World War I and in
the period immediately preceding the
Second World War. In both instances,
the withdrawal of this country from a
forthright international role appeared to
lie at the heart of this pessimism.
Unique today is the fact that public
and congressional opinion has shifted
from uncritical support for the exercise
of great power responsibility, towards a
reluctance to accept new obligations and
commitments. Accompanying the feel-
ing that the era of confrontation with
communist nations is at an end, is
growing sentiment for a moratorium
on the taking of fresh initiatives
abroad. Since we have strained our
human and material resources, and be-
cause the United States is powerless to
cope with the forces that are afoot in
the international arena, so the argu-
ment runs, our preferred posture should
be one of restraint and the avoidance
of tension.
In reality, of course, tension is very
much a part of our lives, individual and
communal. It is a function of modern
technology and the human spirit. As a
result, one should be able to agree with
the hero of Candide who, upon his re-
turn from the battlefields of the Thirty
Years War, engaged in a debate with his
mentor Pangloss over the lessons to be
learned from that great war. He dis-
agreed with the latter’s unworldly con-
tention that everything is for the best
in the best of all possible worlds, and
Pangloss’s admonition, &dquo;Now let us sit
down and talk about perfect harmony.&dquo;
Candide replied: &dquo;No. Let us not talk
about harmony because there is no such
thing. But let us try, before we die, to
make sense out of life.&dquo;
THE MAGHRIB: GENERAL PERSPECTIVE
The question of American commit-
ments in North Africa has been debated
with less intensity than has been the
case with most other geographic regions.
In part, this can be attributed to our
lack of identification with the Maghrib
al-aks~-Arabic for &dquo;land of the farthest
west.&dquo; Rarely a part of the main
stream of American diplomatic con-
sciousness before 1939, the Maghrib be-
came a focal point only in November
1942 with the landing of American
troops in a major military operation
hopefully christened Torch and the sub-
sequent historic meeting of President
Roosevelt with the ruler of Morocco,
Muhammad V, at Casablanca.
According to one of his progeny, the
President offered unsolicited assurances
to the Moroccan Monarch concerning
his country’s future sovereignty. His-
tory records, however, that Morocco,
together with Algeria and Tunisia, re-
turned to full French control on the
conclusion of World War II. Neverthe-
less, our contacts with the region were
not to pass unnoticed. The United
States retained control over Wheelus Air
Force Base outside Tripoli after the
cessation of hostilities, and was a strong
proponent of Libyan independence when
the fate of that former Italian colony
came under consideration in United
Nations councils.
During the initial post-1945 period
of American involvement in Middle
Eastern affairs, a number of paradoxes
developed, however. In contrast to the
ease with which we accommodated to
the return of French colonial rule in the
Maghrib, the United States declared
itself ready to uphold the independence
and territorial integrity of states else-
where in the Mediterranean. Under the
terms of the Truman Doctrine, the
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United States offered &dquo;to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted sub-
jugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures&dquo; and to support them
in efforts to work out their own
destinies in their own way.&dquo;
Despite this enunciation of principle,
U.S. foreign policy followed a uniquely
different path in North Africa. For
example, as a result of the apparent
threat of Soviet military aggrandizement
in Western Europe, while American
forces were engaged in Korea, an agree-
ment was concluded with the govern-
ment of France in 1950 to construct and
maintain Strategic Air Command bases
in the French Protectorate of Morocco,
without formal consultation with King
Muhammad V. Moreover, three years
later, Washington was otherwise occu-
pied when the French Resident General
at Rabat determined that Muhammad V
had become too closely identified with
the Moroccan nationalist movement,
ousted him on August 20, 1953, and
dispatched the King into exile.
By contrast, the United States proved
unstinting in its support of Idris I, who,
from the date of Libyan independence
in December 1951, served as his coun-
try’s political rudder and stabilizing in-
fluence. This apparent contradiction in
approach left more than a handful of
observers perplexed about American
policy in North Africa. Some, wounded
by apparent contradiction, were mind-
ful of a historical parallel in the ap-
pointment of a noble lord to the British
secretaryship of state for foreign affairs
during the nineteenth century. The ap-
pointee, as the French observed, seemed
an admirable candidate, parceque les
aflaires lui seront étrangères.
However, the seeming contradictions
of U.S. policy were more apparent than
real. This was a period of nationalist
awakening in much of the Third World,
a time of social disorganization and of
revolutionary change. The prism of
American policy had to take these fac-
tors into account, as well as to assess
their relationship to broad American
strategies and interests in the Mediter-
ranean region as a whole.
Within this context, security interests
were bound to overrule moral precepts.
In a period of fluidity, overshadowed
by the Korean conflict, tough-minded-
ness was certain to prevail. With the
passage of time, however, it became
apparent to Europe that the preserva-
tion of empire in the face of stern na-
tionalist opposition was a wasting ven-
ture. In due course, France ended its
imperium in North Africa, in part as a
result of nagging U.N. resolutions, but
primarily because the costs of protracted
conflict were proving too costly. It
would not be uncharitable to note that
during much of this early period the
United States played only a marginal
role in the final resolution of the
colonial issue.
THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS
After many years in the shadows, the
Maghrib began to emerge on the world
scene with startling urgency in 1950.
The rapid development of nationalist
movements, the creation of urban-based
labor organizations, and the mobiliza-
tion of rural communities behind the
nationalist urge for independence were
indicative of the ferment that was
spreading through the region. Dramatic
events hallmarked the early period in-
cluding the exile of Habib Bourguiba
from Tunisia, the Casablanca riots of
December 1952, the outbreak of the
Algerian conflict in November 1954, the
French-Tunisian Accord of June 1955
granting the latter internal autonomy,
the Oued Zem massacres of August 1955,
the return of King Muhammad V to the
Moroccan throne later in 1955, and the
French decision to grant Morocco and
Tunisia independence in March 1956.
This was followed six years later,
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after considerable travail, by a similar
dispensation for Algeria.
Independence came in a springtide of
popular enthusiasm, but the leaders of
each nation found that governmental
responsibility was more than a question
of directing legions of loyal supporters.
In Morocco, the number of problems
that confronted Muhammad V, the
Istiqlal party, and the Union Marocaine
du Travail were staggering. The na-
tional administration, once largely the
domain of French officialdom, had to be
rehabilitated. For its part, the monar-
chy had to legitimize its rule, apportion
cabinet portfolios among competing po-
litical parties, and reunite Moroccan
society, which had been divided by forty
years of colonial partition. Moreover,
new cadres of intermediate and higher
level administrators and technicians had
to be found; teachers were needed to
meet the growing demand for educa-
tion ; and political life had, perforce,
to be stabilized in the aftermath of
decolonization.
Tunisia, like Morocco, was a nation
en rodage in 1956. Unlike Morocco’s
Istiqlal leadership, however, Habib
Bourguiba had fashioned his Neo-
Destour party into a dominant political
entity. In the process, he had created
a &dquo;unilineal oligarchy&dquo; which mobilized
the Tunisian people behind the Neo-
Destour. For the overwhelming major-
ity, Bourguiba’s leadership proved mas-
terful, almost charismatic. The Presi-
dent had attained such eminence that
he was quickly able to introduce sweep-
ing social, economic, and political re-
forms. Some proved so iconoclastic that
Bourguiba and his Destourians were in-
creasingly referred to as the modern-day
Kemalists of the Middle East.
On the other hand, few governments
created since World War II faced
greater problems in establishing and
maintaining their authority than Alge-
ria. At independence, in mid-1962,
Algeria had few conventions or institu-
tions to guide her through her difficult
postwar period of rehabilitation. A
sturdy democratic tradition had not been
implanted; politics had largely been the
preserve of the Europeans. Experience
in the art of governing was limited, and
no meaningful effort had been made
during the seven-year period of the
liberation struggle to organize cadres of
administrators, technicians, and bureau-
crats. Finally, no polititically inte-gra-
tive mechanism emerged from the early
nationalist experience. Unlike Tunisia’s
Destourian-Socialist party, the aura of
legitimacy that surrounded the National
Liberation Front (FLN)-the engine
of nationalist revolution from 1954 to
1962-was dissipated in the ensuing
scramble for power.
In mid-1962 Algeria found herself on
the threshold of renewed conflict. The
principals in this second act of violence
were not the European settlers (colons),
however. The vast majority of these,
approximately 850 thousand out of a
total of 1 million, had fled out of fear of
retribution by Algeria’s 9 million Mus-
lims. The principals were the founders
and leaders of the Algerian revolution,
men who, at the hour of triumph, fell
into disagreement over the distribution
of power and ignored what should have
been a more compelling imperative-the
rehabilitation of a war-torn society.
Thus, the sorting-out process was not
completed until June 1965, when Colonel
Houari Boumedienne deposed Ahmed
Ben Bella and assumed the mantle of
leadership.
The latter event materialized more
than ten years after Libya had been
granted independent status under U.N.
auspices. In the intervening period,
Libya had moved from the position of
international ward to that of a pros-
perous, going national entity. Accom-
plished without trauma and political
upheaval, Libya’s transition followed a
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course prescribed by her venerable
monastic sovereign, Idris I. A man of
deep religious conviction, the King in-
sisted upon his right to direct, to ad-
judicate, and to set the pace of political
growth. The distinctive feature of the
absolutist system formed by Idris was
its isolation from the society at large.
The power elite consisted of the King,
a small coterie of retainers in the
court entourage, and those among his
ministers who enjoyed favored status.
A particularly significant feature of
the absolutist system was its seeming
lack of viability. The King had pro-
duced no male issue, and the question
of succession was perennially clouded.
The heir-apparent, a relative named
Hasan al-Ridha, was a lackluster per-
sonality who was not highly regarded
by the aging septuagenarian ruler. The
King had actually signaled his intention
on several occasions to recommend the
creation of a republic prior to his
demise.
Given the fragility of the Idrisid sys-
tem, its ability to survive for more than
seventeen years may be difficult to com-
prehend. Part of the answer was un-
doubtedly to be found in the fragmented
nature of Libyan society at indepen-
dence. While the ruling elite agreed
on most public issues, the Libyan public
lacked any consensus. The latter was
relatively ill-informed; political parties,
moreover, were proscribed by the King;
what labor union activity existed was
carefully regulated by the ruling oli-
garchy. The threat of coercion always
lurked in the background. In addition,
traditional society was pluralistic in a
profoundly divisive sense. As a result,
the monarchy could play off competing
tribal groups in Cyrenaica, buy off vying
merchant factions in Tripoli and Ben-
ghazi, and harass hard-core irreconcila-
bles. Through these devices, the oli-
garchy could control the resources of
power and influence.
PURPOSES AND GOALS
Convention dictates that we weigh the
efficacy of our policies very much like
junior accountants. Policy consists of
profit and loss columns in which debits
and credits are entered. Within this
context, resources must be allocated
prudently to achieve maximum objec-
tives, programs should be balanced
against finite goals, and competing pri-
orities must be arranged in an orderly
and coherent pattern. In the real world,
of course, policy cannot be treated as a
ledger in which entries are totaled in
multiple colors-red for losses, blue for
gains, grey for undecided benefits.
In a mutated world, policies, goals,
and objectives tend to produce only
limited advantages and gains unless they
are rooted in purposes that are shared
by a number of nations. Jointly shared
conceptions help to avoid the transfor-
mation of policies into a series of unre-
lated improvisations.
In our dealings with the new North
African states, we have shared few com-
mon habits of thought. Clearly, we
have no desire to substitute ourselves for
Europe in a proconsular relationship;
nor have we sought clients in the Ma-
ghrib. Instead, we have offered our
support and our assistance to the
leaders of the new states in their efforts
to grapple with the problems of politi-
cal development and economic growth.
Moreover, the United States has
played a singular role in seeking to
resolve local disputes, in backing re-
gional co-operation, and in bolstering
North African ties with the Western
world. In short, over the past decade
we have dealt with the Maghrib in prag-
matic, low-key terms; our essential goal
has been to avoid the polarization of
forces in the area; the bulk of our ef-
forts has been directed toward collec-
tive action to resolve common problems.
In part, U.S. policies in the decade
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of the sixties has reflected the altered
strategic importance of North Africa in
the Mediterranean power balance.
Technological advances in the missile
field, for example, reduced the signifi-
cance of our bases and landing facilities
in the Maghrib. This factor, together
with rising nationalism, led to the liqui-
dation of virtually all Western facilities
over the past decade; U.S. air bases
in Morocco were removed in 1963; the
French evacuation was completed the
previous year; in the case of Tunisia,
French bases were evacuated by 1963.
While the French-Algerian agreement of
1962 accorded French forces special fa-
cilities for a period of up to fifteen
years, all had gone before the decade
was out. British and American with-
drawal from Libya followed shortly
after the deposition of King Idris by
military officers in September 1969.
During this same period, North Af-
rica’s decline in strategic military im-
portance was partially offset by the dra-
matic increase in the area’s output of oil
and various other mineral resources.
Algeria and Libya, in particular, have
increased their production of oil and
petrochemicals at least tenfold. The
principal consumer, however, has re-
mained Western Europe, and while
American investments have increased to
more than $1 billion, the area’s eco-
nomic significance is clearly greater for
Europe than the United States.
What has given North Africa a par-
ticularly unique status for the United
States has not been its location, re-
sources, or military capabilities but,
rather, the quality of its leadership, the
moderate political systems which have
been implanted after independence, and
the inclination of most North Africans
to face problems of political develop-
ment with a balanced sense of hope and
limitation. As a result, U.S. foreign
aid contributions-direct and indirect-
to Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya have
been substantial. By conservative esti-
mate, our aid has exceeded $1 billion
over the past two decades.
In providing this assistance, we have
been caught in a serious policy dilemma.
As pointed out by Professor Samuel
Huntington:
In the past the US Government has been
caught between two beliefs, each of which
is undoubtedly supported by large elements
of American opinion and each of which is
in part true: first, that the people of a
country have a right to shape their own
political, economic and social institutions
free from outside interference; and second
that the most desirable society is a
pluralistic one characterized by private
enterprise, social equity and political
democracy....1
These precepts do set up competing
demands. Clearly, we are hopeful that
other peoples will emulate our society
and fashion political systems similar to
our own. On the other hand, the ques-
tion does arise as to the propriety of
using assistance as leverage to induce the
type of change we desire-both political
and social.
On the whole, the United States has
preferred to support a pragmatic ap-
proach, one in which our interests in
North Africa are brought into rough
balance with our aspirations. As a re-
sult, assistance, in all its various forms,
has been provided a wide array of
governments-republican and monarchi-
cal-supporting differing ideologies-so-
cialist and mixed capitalist-socialist-
and espousing divergent foreign policy
goals-nonaligned, neutralist, and pro-
Western. Throughout this period, how-
ever, our approach has been consistent
and practical. We have forsworn direct
intervention in local affairs, often in the
face of momentary distractions and
seeming setbacks. They have covered
1. Samuel P. Huntington, "Foreign Aid for
What and for Whom," Foreign Policy, No. 2
(Spring 1971), p. 126.
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a broad spectrum over the past decade
including: the division of North Africa
into competing blocs as a result of the
Congo crisis in 1960-61; the eruption
of intramural rivalries and disputes
over boundary questions, leading to the
Moroccan-Algeria conflict of 1963; the
subsequent intervention of the Soviet
Union, which has become Algeria’s main
arms supplier; the Casablanca riots of
1965, reflecting the economic frustra-
tions of local workers and students, and
the resultant assumption of extralegal
powers by King Hasan in June 1965;
the outbreak of anti-American violence
in several North African urban centers
following the defeat of Arab armies by
Israel in 1967; and, of course, the
abrupt termination of the Idrisid dy-
nasty in 1969 at the hands of a small
group of disaffected army officers.
Perhaps the severest disappointment
for most observers has been the failure
of the Maghribi states to form closer
political ties. The basic ingredients for
unity appeared to exist. Shared colonial
experience, a common religious founda-
tion, and proximity all seemed to favor
close political association. Moreover,
the leaders of most of North Africa’s
political formations had developed har-
monious personal relations during the
liberation struggle. All the early signs
appeared to point toward close post-
independence collaboration, if not some
form of union.
This vocation for unity found its most
concrete expression in the Tangier Con-
ference of April 195,8, at which spokes-
men for the Istiqlal, National Libera-
tion Front, and the Destour met to
establish the outlines of a common ap-
proach to mutual problems. The con-
ference recommended, inter alia, the
creation of committees to insure greater
coordination of policies. The cap stone
was to be a consultative assembly of
the Arab Maghrib and a permanent
secretariat. However, co-operation soon
fell apart in the Congo crisis, exacer-
bated by Morocco’s territorial claims in
the western Sahara and Tunisia’s exten-
sion of diplomatic recognition to the
Daddah government in Mauritania. In
addition, personal rivalries and ideo-
logical differences widened the gap
among the various leadership groups.
While efforts to fashion close regional
ties have revived in recent years, no
appreciable progress has been registered
to date. If anything, the decision of
Libya’s military leaders to enlist in a
loose-jointed federation with Egypt and
Syria in 1971 has been viewed as a
check to revived Maghribi aspirations
for regional association.
A SERVICEABLE APPROACH
Current American policy in North
Africa is neither activist nor Thermi-
dorian. It avoids both extremes em-
phasizing, instead, the basic long-range
interests of the West-close commercial
and economic ties, support for peaceful
resolution of local disputes, and pro-
vision of assistance to countries bent
upon political and social growth. In
pursuit of these interests, we have
avoided undue bemusement over the
origins of local regimes, their im-
mediate political philosophies, or their
evident shortcomings. The United
States has supported in turn royalists
and republicans, ideologues and prag-
matists, irredentists and strict construc-
tionists.
Does this suggest that our policy
is beset by paradoxical befuddlement?
Since paradox, like beauty, is often a
part of the perspective of the beholder,
such an assessment may not seem un-
reasonable. But what has mainly dis-
tinguished the U.S. approach to the area
has been its consistency and service-
ability rather than uncertainty and
paradox.
Nowhere has this been more evident
than in the case of Libya. For more
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than seventeen years, the United States
closely identified with and provided sub-
stantial support for King Idris, despite
the many apparent deficiencies of his
regime.
King Idris came to power in 1951
with credentials that seemed impeccable.
He had long opposed Italian colonial
domination from his place of exile in
Egypt; he had rallied Cyrenaican forces
to the Allied cause during World War II
and subsequently returned to Libya to
be appointed Emir of Cyrenaica. In
the latter capacity, Idris had been a
tireless exponent of Libyan indepen-
dence. A gentle patrician, he was also
a claimant to recognition as a religious
figure because of his position as leader
of the Sanusi brotherhood, a confra-
ternity founded by his grandfather in
1842. What made Idris’ political pri-
macy inevitable, however, was his ac-
ceptability among most Libyan political
factions as a compromise leader, one
without special axes to grind.
The political system implanted by
Idris proved a curious blend of gentle
authoritarianism and puritanical tradi-
tionalism. Idris, throughout this reign,
insisted upon personal loyalty and sup-
port by his ministers for Libya’s essen-
tial goal of independence. Whatever
the deficiencies of the highly personal-
ized system of government that the King
perpetuated, he played a singular role in
developing a sense of nationhood. For
many Libyans, the King was for many
years the personification of the Libyan
state.
Social change can and frequently does
give rise to new claimants to power.
In the case of Libya, the precipitants
of change were tao be found in the dis-
covery of oil, a historic occasion in 1959
that unleashed new political forces. The
Idrisid regime found itself increasingly
unable to cope, despite recourse to a
lengthy procession of mediocre minis-
ters. When the army intervened ten
years later, surprisingly little popular
resistance materialized, and the King,
who was traveling abroad, took up his
involuntary exile in Cairo.
The cynical observer could, of course,
criticize the United States for having
supported a losing cause. In doing so,
he would ignore the essential success of
a policy dedicated to the survival of
Libya as a going concern, and the piv-
otal position of the King in providing the
stability needed to draw the diverse seg-
ments of Libyan society together. Idris,
despite his many frailties, afforded his
countrymen an opportunity to fashion
the bonds needed to make their nation
endure. In the end, his fall from power
is less significant than the impetus he
provided to Libya’s evolution as a na-
tion.
The American contribution to this
process was both material and substan-
tial. To a large extent, our success,
or lack thereof, should be measured not
in terms of the political longevity of
Idris, but in terms of the survival
of Libya as a nation-state. Within this
framework, the cynics must defer to
history.
In a sense, we end as we began.
Those foreign affairs specialists who are
members of the &dquo;revisionist school&dquo; will
continue to regard U.S. foreign policy as
essentially the pursuit of imperialist ob-
jectives. They will evaluate our goals
in North Africa as an attempt to super-
impose American influence and values.
Those who are not committed to a par-
ticular view may evaluate our role from
a different perspective-our contribution
to the political development of free na-
tions. In the latter context, the United
States has demonstrated in North Africa
that it is prepared to support construc-
tive governments and programs, not as
an intrusive world power, but as a force
for peaceful change.
